Can We Really Call Bullshit?: Bullshit, Anti-Intellectualism, and the Need for Vulnerability in Rhetoric

Bruce Bowles, Jr., Texas A&M University-Central Texas

(Published May 28, 2020)

Bullshit—It’s Complicated!

Before Donald Trump announced his intentions to run for office and throughout his campaign, he consistently railed against the decline of the U.S. economy, specifically under the Obama Administration. According to Donald Trump, the Obama Administration had crippled the economy, and he was the best person to fix the problem. After taking office, he continued this line of reasoning during his Joint Address to Congress on February 28, 2017. President Trump proclaimed:

Tonight, as I outline the next steps we must take as a country, we must honestly acknowledge the circumstances we inherited. Ninety-four million Americans are out of the labor force…More than one in five people in their prime working years are not working. We have the worst financial recovery in 65 years. (Trump)           

As I watched, one phrase in particular especially stood out—94 million Americans out of the labor force. Something immediately seemed off with this number, as if it could not possibly be correct. A crucial piece of context had to be missing. 

The number is indeed shocking but, surprisingly, true. Donald Trump was not lying when he stated this fact; it is a verifiable statistic. However, I would contend he was engaging in bullshit in philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s sense of the word. Frankfurt famously explicated his definition of bullshit in his 1986 article “On Bullshit,” later published as the book On Bullshit in 2005. Frankfurt’s definition distinguishes lying from bullshit by defining lying as knowing—but deliberately misrepresenting—the truth, while bullshit is, at its heart, a “lack of connection to a concern with truth,” an “indifference to how things really are” (33-34). For Frankfurt, in order to lie, one must still be engaged with the truth; willful misrepresentation requires an awareness of that which is true in order to conceal or obscure it. Bullshit, though, has no such constraint.

This distinction is critical for Frankfurt. As Frankfurt observes, “This points to a similar and fundamental aspect of the essential nature of bullshit: although it is produced without concern with the truth, it need not be false” (47-48). President Trump’s remarks during his Joint Address to Congress highlight Frankfurt’s distinction in a rather enlightening fashion. The figure is factually correct, yet it is quite misleading and unconcerned with the truth. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines employment, unemployment, and the labor force in precise ways. If someone is working, they are employed; those who do not have a job, but are available to work and are actively seeking employment, are unemployed; the labor force is a combination of the two; those who are neither employed nor currently seeking employment are not considered part of the labor force. Thus, a key phrase in President Trump’s statement is “out of the labor force.” When President Trump cited this statistic, he was not referring to those seeking, but unable to obtain, employment. He was accounting for those not actively seeking employment.[1]

At the time of President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress, 44.1 million of the 94 million not in the labor force were retired, 15.5 million were in college or training for employment, 15.4 million were disabled, and 12.9 million were electing to care for a family member (Gillespie). Furthermore, President Trump omitted an important fact that calls the ethics of his statement into question—the official unemployment rate at the time of his Joint Address to Congress was 4.8%, one of the lowest rates since the financial crisis of 2008. Rather than “the worst financial recovery in 65 years,” the Obama Administration had witnessed a sharp decline in the unemployment rate after facing a severe economic crisis. President Trump’s statement, while factually correct, demonstrates the “lack of connection to a concern with truth” that Frankfurt views as the essence of bullshit. 

Not all instances of bullshit are as “clear cut” as this one, and even this specific example is more complicated than it appears at first glance (more on this later). Frankfurt’s definition—and distinction—are certainly not without their critics. Both G.A. Cohen and James Fredal note how such a distinction requires knowledge of, or at least speculation as to, a rhetor’s internal state, which is famously difficult to ascertain. Although it may be tempting to analyze a rhetor’s intentions, such insinuations often rely on incomplete information and/or speculation. As would be expected, complications quickly arise from this approach. As Fredal observes, “For those who focus on the bullshitter, no discourse can properly be called bullshit without first ascertaining an internal state: the speaker's motives and goals, adequacy of methods, and mental health” (247). Past behavior, contextual factors, etc. can provide some solid supporting evidence for such an accusation of bullshit based on the speaker’s internal state, yet these accusations rarely are definitive or beyond refutation. Sans knowledge of President Trump’s internal state, the distinction becomes a mere guessing game.

Fredal further notes that discourse can have aims and purposes beyond ascertaining the truth and that rhetors can have varying levels of confidence in the truth of their discourse (244). Frankfurt’s definition relies on a rather objective view of truth to which a rhetor either adheres to or strays from. And yet, not all rhetors are operating from such an absolute definition of truth. In fact, although rhetoric relies on “certain facts, foundational realities, and universal truths” for its foundation, it is not exclusively focused on truth (McComiskey 7). Rhetors may speak of truth in less than absolute terms; they may be comfortable with a degree of uncertainty in the claims they make and even speak to that uncertainty openly and honestly. Rhetoric does not always adhere to such a strict binary between truth and falsehood. 

These complications lead to the central question of this article—Can we really call bullshit? Taken at face value, this might seem rather apparent (Of course we can!), but from an epistemological and rhetorical standpoint this can be quite complicated. As sociologist Steve Fuller points out, “The bullshit detector believes not only that there is a truth but also that her own access to it is sufficiently reliable and general to serve as a standard by which others may be held accountable” (246). Those who call bullshit have to lay claim to some form of truth by which to evaluate the alleged bullshit. The question then becomes a matter of standard as well as point of view. How can we call bullshit on discourse without resorting to a sort of “bullshit” of our own by claiming a privileged position of access to the truth that we—by all accounts—most likely do not have? 

To deal with this issue, this article will first address the issues with calling bullshit through various epistemological vantage points, including the previously addressed intentions of the speaker, the reception by the audience, and the inherent features of the discourse. After, I will offer the term anti-intellectual bullshit, which refers to discourse that refuses to play by its own epistemological rules while solely seeking to maintain truth, not advance it, as a potential solution. Such a classification provides rhetoricians with the ability to call bullshit without having to occupy a position of privileged access to an objective truth since the critique is predicated on the truth established by the discourse itself, enabling critique of disingenuous rhetorical tactics on logical grounds while still allowing for multiple perspectives. Furthermore, the article will suggest some strategies for potentially dealing with those who engage in anti-intellectual bullshit. And, lastly, the article will conclude by addressing the need for vulnerability in rhetorical discourse in order to avoid anti-intellectual bullshit, suggesting that we need not only be concerned with calling bullshit on others but remain reflective about our own inclinations toward participating in such endeavors.

Ethos, Pathos, Logos, and Bullshit: Bullshit through Different Lenses

While one of the first to grapple with bullshit on an academic level, Frankfurt is by far the last scholarly voice on the topic. His work has led to a plethora of journal articles and book chapters across multiple disciplines, including philosophy, political science, psychology, rhetoric, and sociology. Since there are a variety of unique and nuanced ways in which scholars address bullshit, Fredal provides a useful heuristic for examining the conversations surrounding it. He views theories and analyses of bullshit as a trivium. They can focus on the intent and character of the speaker, the willingness (or unwillingness) of the audience to accept the claims, and inherent features of the discourse, with the three closely mirroring ethos, pathos, and logos (245). Frankfurt’s definition most closely aligns with the intent and character of the speaker, as the speaker needs to be unconcerned with the truth, not misrepresenting it, to be considered a bullshitter. Thus, the speaker’s intention is the crucial factor in determining whether something is, indeed, bullshit. As previously discussed, this approach to bullshit runs into significant issues with intentionality and inference.

Audience reception has several proponents, including psychologists. Gordon Pennycook et al. studied individual ability to detect a certain type of bullshit: pseudo-profound bullshit. For Pennycook et al., pseudo-profound bullshit refers to vague and ambiguous discourse that appears profound on the surface but is actually devoid of meaning (550). Across four studies, Pennycook et al. used computer-generated sentences that possessed syntactical coherence yet were purely constructed using buzzwords that were both random and vague. Pennycook et al. found several personality characteristics and traits that correlated with an inability to detect pseudo-profound bullshit, including a lack of reflectiveness, lower cognitive ability, conspiratorial ideation, religious and/or paranormal belief, and favorable views toward alternative medicine (559). People with these characteristics, their research suggests, are less talented at detecting bullshit and more prone to fall for it.

However, Craig Dalton criticized their research for failing to account for subjectivity. Dalton believes it possible to find profound meaning in seemingly paradoxical statements, especially in Eastern cultural traditions. Essentially, Dalton argues, whether a statement is profound or not is contingent on the subjective interpretation of the individual. Even if the statements were computer-generated from random buzz words, this fact does not make them inherently devoid of meaning. Dalton contends that paradox is at the heart of many religious, spiritual, and cultural traditions; viewing paradox as bullshit, then, reflects a bias towards Western ways of thinking and reasoning. In this manner, audience reception has significant flaws as a gauge of whether something is bullshit or not, since such reception can be predicated upon certain idiosyncrasies that are not necessarily definitively right or wrong.

Although Fredal argues for a more comprehensive view of bullshit that transcends the trivium, he too tends to align most closely with audience reception. He views “the feeling of disregard” as a vital feature of bullshit (254). This feeling of disregard can take numerous forms, as Fredal theorizes: 

 Bullshit happens, more generally then, when one party in an encounter feels superior enough (in position, authority, or rhetorical skill, for example) to dispense with the rituals of cooperative interaction, leading the other to feel treated without due deference; when one participant in an exchange appears to have been undeservedly slighted; or when one side of a dialogue is unjustly disregarded. Bullshit arises from arrogant gestures of disregard. (256)

Disregard certainly does play a role in bullshit, yet disregard falls prey to a host of issues.

First, disregard is highly subjective (albeit Fredal accounts for the subjectivity in his theory). If disregard is determined by the audience’s reception, then an audience can only fall prey to bullshit if they determine the discourse to indeed be bullshit. However, bullshit is at its finest—presumably—when it is not detected. Feeling disregard, then, would mean discourse is only bullshit when it is viewed as bullshit, making the entire argument purely a matter of circular reasoning. Furthermore, feelings of disregard can occur even when the rhetor is genuine in intent and/or presenting a logical argument. An audience is quite likely to feel disregarded when their cherished beliefs are challenged and disproven. In fact, an audience might be prone to not feel disregarded precisely when they are being fed bullshit that promotes their false beliefs. Disregard, then, has no connection to truth, whether an “absolute” truth or even a contextual truth.

Disregard for a side of an argument can also be a rhetorical necessity. Ideally, this will not be the case. Nevertheless, certain arguments (e.g. climate change denial, flat-Earth theory, the birther movement, etc.) are on such shaky epistemological/factual grounds that to treat them with respect would demonstrate a tremendous amount of disregard for those actually affected by the consequences of these arguments.[2] Without a basis for calling bullshit, every argument will need to be treated with equal respect. This “both sides” approach has had dire consequences, especially in the examples of global climate change and anti-vaccination rhetoric (McIntyre 27-34). Precious time has been wasted in order to avoid disregarding one side of the argument that was never on equal footing when it came to factual truths. 

Problems also emerge when discussing bullshit defined by features of the discourse itself, albeit this is the approach I find most promising. Defining bullshit in this fashion tends to rely heavily on categorizing bullshit. Cohen accomplishes this in response to the work of Frankfurt, discussing another type of bullshit dissimilar to Frankfurt’s: unclarifiable unclarity (129). For Cohen, unclarifiable unclarity is discourse “…that is not only obscure but which cannot be rendered unobscured, where any apparent success in rendering it unobscured creates something that isn’t recognizable as a version of what was said” (130). This type of bullshit focuses on forms of academic obscurantism which communicate little of substance in such an extravagant way as to appear deep and sophisticated. The nature of the discourse itself marks it as bullshit, regardless of the rhetor’s intentions or whether it is received well. (Cohen admits such bullshit frequently is received well, even by him in his younger years.) Political scientist Mark Evans even adds five other categories of bullshit to Frankfurt’s and Cohen’s, including clarifiable unclarity, rubbish, irretrievable speculation, pretension or over-portentousness, and a final catch-all category including evasion, elision, insincerity, and procrastination (199). Although quite useful from a classification sense, they are rather precarious if one wishes to call bullshit since claims made from these perspectives rely on rather precise epistemological grounds.

Following this line of thought, sociologist Joshua Wakeham casts doubts on how much we can identify bullshit through the discourse itself. As he aptly surmises, such an argument “…assumes a kind of privileged, bullshit-detection, epistemic position where there is clear and consistent access to the truth” (26). He further contends that the ability to ascertain definitive knowledge of reality can oscillate from context to context, with certain contexts providing higher degrees of certainty than others. Wakham views analysis of bullshit through the features of the discourse as relativistic in nature but with the caveat that degrees of certainty can vary depending on context. Presumably, then, our ability to call bullshit might be more valid in certain circumstances than in others.

Such a position runs the risk of falling into a trap of neutrality that places all knowledge claims on equal footing. Evans summarizes this risk, commenting “‘Equal respect’ leads to the relativist game of ‘I’m valid, you’re valid: we’re all entitled to our opinions’, wherein having ‘an equal right to express an opinion’ becomes conflated with the claim of ‘equal validity of whatever opinion is expressed’…” (196). This approach can have disastrous consequences. Without any definitive parameters for calling bullshit on the basis of the inherent features of the discourse itself, the only options left are incomplete (and potentially reckless) inferences about the state and/or character of the speaker, evaluations of the reception by the audience, or a relativistic denouncement of the endeavor altogether. 

This leads directly into the problems neutrality poses. Although calling bullshit might be an epistemologically and rhetorically sketchy practice, it is also vital for healthy discourse. Without the ability to call bullshit, discourse is placed on equal footing, whether explicitly or implicitly. There is no room for distinctions in regard to the validity of any particular argument, which only encourages such practices as confirmation bias and tribalism. Unable to distinguish between arguments, an audience is likely to continue to follow its own proclivities, no matter how ill-founded and uninformed they may be. The previous classifications that have been critiqued are all excellent as heuristics for analyzing bullshit; accusations of bullshit through these means, however, are on shaky ground. In these instances, bullshit tends to be in the eye of the beholder; the accusation is predicated upon the accusers own epistemological leanings and assumptions. What is needed is a classification of bullshit that can be analyzed through its inherent features but is not reliant on universal claims to truth—a type of bullshit that analyzes discourse based on the epistemological and rhetorical grounds the discourse itself claims.

Playing by Its Own Rules: Anti-Intellectual Bullshit 

In order to rectify this, I suggest a particular type of bullshit that approaches bullshit through its inherent features yet accounts for the concerns of the subjective nature of many of our knowledge claims—anti-intellectual bullshit. With the term anti-intellectual bullshit, I aim to classify discourse that refuses to play by the epistemological rules and/or foundations it has established, whether explicitly or implicitly. Such a form of bullshit is anti-intellectual since it is enacted solely to maintain—not advance—knowledge and truth. By not adhering to its own rules, it renders itself unassailable; in essence, no counterargument can overcome it.

When it comes to epistemological rules and/or foundations, this expression is not meant to be rigid. It merely expresses a need for consistency in regard to the types of reasoning and evidence that can support an argument. With anti-intellectual bullshit, this frequently oscillates to serve the rhetor’s needs. The rhetor will rely on anecdotal evidence to support their claim, but criticize any counterargument advancing anecdotal evidence as not being empirical enough; the rhetor will employ a metric as evidence for their argument yet dismiss this same metric the second it no longer suits the argument being advanced (e.g. President Trump and economic indicators), without providing any rationale as to why the metric is no longer valid. The same reasoning and evidence that can advance the argument are rendered futile in disproving it. 

This results in the discourse becoming irrefutable. Anti-intellectual bullshit insulates the discourse from being challenged; it establishes a truth and then operates accordingly to maintain that truth. Incapable of being proven false, knowledge becomes static. Gaining further knowledge and/or a better understanding of reality are not the objectives—adhering to established knowledge and current perspectives on reality are the end game. A quick litmus test as to whether rhetorical discourse is operating as anti-intellectual bullshit is simple. If no reasoning or evidence—even if highly implausible—can be presented to challenge or even question the argument being advanced, anti-intellectual bullshit is most likely being deployed.[3]

At this juncture, some examples will be helpful to illustrate what anti-intellectual bullshit looks like in practice. Returning to President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress in 2017 provides an intriguing starting point. While his use of “out of the labor force” is indeed bullshit, it is not necessarily disingenuous taken at face value. Many of the reasons people find themselves out of the labor force are indeed not matters of individual agency. Those who are on disability often desperately wish to be part of the labor force but cannot; those in college are oftentimes not working since they are acquiring new knowledge and skills to replace those they originally had, which are no longer economically viable; those who stay at home to care for a family member are often forced to since they lack the financial means of providing adequate care for their family while working. Economists and politicians across the political spectrum have pointed to the high number of people out of the labor force as indeed problematic.[4] Merely citing the number is not what makes President Trump’s statement anti-intellectual bullshit. 

Thus, I contend, if President Trump did indeed want to use this statistic to point to the failures of the Obama administration, he was entitled to. It is a fair argument to make, even if some may not be inclined to agree. What makes this argument an example of anti-intellectual bullshit is that President Trump established an implicit rule for evaluating the economy then failed to adhere to his own rule moving forward. After his Joint Address to Congress, his proclamations of a thriving economy returned to a reliance on traditional economic metrics which were already impressive during President Obama’s administration. Since then, he has never substantially addressed the number of people out of the labor force again.[5] Rather than establishing a new epistemological approach to evaluating the economy and complying with it, Trump instead selectively employed this approach solely to maintain a particular “truth”—Obama had ruined the economy and he was fixing it.

If President Trump were being intellectually honest, economic measures such as the unemployment rate, Gross-Domestic Product (GDP), the performance of the stock market, and the number of people out of the labor force would be compared between President Obama’s Administration and President Trump’s Administration. President Trump could make comparisons and show improvement (or declines); he could even provide rationales for why particular economic measures might not be performing well through no fault of his own. In this instance, though, he held President Obama’s administration to a standard of evaluation for which he has not held his own administration accountable. The ability to oscillate between economic indicators so readily makes it impossible to assail any claim President Trump makes as to a thriving economy. Deductive claims are not inherently faulty, as rhetorician Patricia Roberts-Miller notes, but they are “…problematic when they are set up in a way that all disconfirming examples can be rejected” (Demagoguery and Democracy 53).

While it would be all too easy to claim that President Donald Trump is an epic bullshit artist in comparison to most presidents, this would—I believe—miss the point. All rhetors choose which facts, narratives, quotes, etc. to make prominent and which to omit. Rhetoricians Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss this phenomenon, observing, "By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed such a choice endows these elements with a presence” (116-117). It is fair to say that all presidents have engaged in creating presence from economic indicators to one degree or another. The performance of the economy has a substantial impact on a president’s reelection chances, and determining the president’s influence on the economy has always been wrought with epistemological complications and debate. President Trump is not the first to engage in this rhetorical subterfuge—he is just the most recent and germane example. The real issue with the tack he takes is that the presence he creates for certain economic indicators oscillates on a whim to suit the particular truth he wishes to advance at any given moment.

Intelligent design and flat-Earth theory also provide intriguing examples of anti-intellectual bullshit.[6] ID relies on pseudo-scientific epistemology to create “gaps” in evolutionary theory and demands precise scientific evidence for how these gaps can exist. Yet it merely offers an unsubstantiated, unscientific claim—divine intervention—to explain the gaps itself. Intelligent design’s discourse creates a requirement of rigorous scientific explanations for the entirety of evolutionary theory while adhering to less rigorous speculation to advocate for its alternative. It shifts the implicit rules of the discourse to its own advantage, refusing to argue on an equal playing field with its opponents. Impossible evidence is required to prove evolution true; gaps in evolutionary theory, though, are conveniently explained by reference to a divine creator whose interventions do not have any scientific evidence. As a result, intelligent design cannot reasonably be disproven on the epistemological foundations it establishes since these foundations are not equivalent between the intelligent design community and evolutionary biologists.[7]

Those in the flat-Earth community operate similarly, relying on questioning certain scientific proofs, usually reinterpreted through questionable epistemological methods, as evidence that heliocentric models are indeed flawed; however, their own model possesses a litany of questionable (at best) scientific proofs that are addressed merely by engaging in sophomoric scientific practices or are defended as being “not yet explained,” which—conveniently—only serves to demonstrate how much more open-minded their community is to ambiguity. As Roberts-Miller so eloquently puts it, “Paradoxically, that the evidence is nonfalsifiable, overwhelmed by counterevidence, or disconfirmed by reliable sources functions to enhance its credibility among those who can interpret it correctly (that is, those who read it in the light of the inferred conspiracy)” (“Conspiracy Bullshit” 466). Conspiracy theorists are—in many ways—the ultimate anti-intellectual bullshitters. The discourse merely seeks to maintain beliefs passionately held, ever changing its own rules in support of a thesis while demanding the opposition to play by the established rules of the debate. 

These two examples are also further evidence of one of the critiques in regard to Frankfurt’s conceptualization of bullshit and evaluating bullshit through the intent of the speaker. For, as anyone who has ever debated someone in the intelligent design and/or flat-Earth communities can attest, these people are definitely not unconcerned with the truth. As philosopher George Reisch rightly observes, “If the ID movement counts as bullshit, then Frankfurt’s definition is in error. For advocates of ID are plainly not indifferent to truth…” (37, emphasis original). Thus, the major flaw in Frankfurt’s definition becomes apparent—he fails to account for those who actually believe their own bullshit!

This is why anti-intellectual bullshit is difficult to handle rhetorically and—potentially—why it is becoming so prevalent in public discourse. Concerned with the maintenance of a particular truth rather than pursuing truth—and characterized by a refusal to adhere to the rules it explicitly or implicitly establishes—anti-intellectual bullshit is seemingly immune to counterargument or other persuasive tactics. Oftentimes, the audience does not wish to be persuaded, only to affirm belief, and the parameters of the argument are uneven and hypocritical, ever-shifting to suit the needs of the rhetor. In the end, it can be nearly impossible to gain any semblance of a productive result. Thus, another question looms large—is it even worth trying?

Cutting Through the Anti-Intellectual Bullshit: “Confrontation” in Invitational Rhetoric

Cutting through anti-intellectual bullshit can be a difficult, arduous process. Yet it can be aided by two frequently intertwined processes—directly addressing and questioning the implicit rules and frames of the discourse (rather than arguing the claim in circles) as well as embracing a slightly more confrontational version of Sonja Foss’ and Cindy Griffin’s notion of invitational rhetoric. The Daily Show host Trevor Noah’s interview of Tomi Lahren on November 30, 2016, provides an apt illustration of both. 

Noah invited noted conservative Lahren onto his show to address a wide variety of issues during this interview. On the previous night’s episode, Noah grappled with how to handle the anti-intellectualism that was becoming so prevalent. Searching for answers, he offered a solution: “You don’t argue with the toddler if you want to win. Just keep asking the toddler to elaborate, because logic is the downfall of every toddler. Well, that, and shoelaces” (qtd. in Framke). While his comment was snarky in nature, he actually maintained a congenial and calm demeanor while interviewing Lahren the next night but did employ the aforementioned tactic. One of the most engaging portions of the interview came when Noah and Lahren discussed Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling for the national anthem.[8]

During this portion of the interview, Noah maintained a consistent refrain—some variation of “How should I protest?” Rather than directly trying to contest Lahren’s claims, he instead focused his line of questioning on getting her to clarify her argument in a particular fashion. Repeatedly, Lahren attempted to discuss why she believed kneeling during the national anthem was offensive and avoided discussion of proper methods of protesting. But Noah’s consistent refrain eventually refocused the discussion on how African Americans should protest.

Noah: I don’t think that that’s what the argument is. What I’m saying is, I asked you one question and that is, how should a Black person bring up their grievances? That’s all I ask, how? If that’s not the right way, if marching isn’t the right way, what is the right way? 

Lahren: When you talk, what he said was he is protesting the anthem and the flag because of the oppression of Black people in this country. I would like him to further explain what he’s talking about when he’s discussing the Black oppression in this country…

Noah: …which he has…

Lahren: …also. Is it against police? Is it against the government? I’m not sure what oppression he is discussing. I would love to have him come on my show and discuss it with me. To me, when you make the flag, and you make the anthem the outlet for your anger, or the outlet through which you are going to protest your country that you live in, that you reside in, that you take $19,000,000 a year from, I don’t think that that is the correct outlet for your anger. 

Noah: So, so…

Lahren: …so what is he protesting? So he’s…

Noah: …again, you haven’t answered my question of how. How you want black people…

Lahren: …so then…

Noah: …I’m just asking how. And I’m asking you honestly. I’m not saying it in a challenging way. I’m saying to you, I don’t know the answer apart from these methods. So I would like to know if you ever thought about how? Because you’re not the first person I’ve met who has said this. I’ve seen this message online. I’m not labelling you as the bad person. I just want to know if you’ve ever thought of the how. That’s all I want to know.

Lahren: For me, I think there are a lot of folks in this country. I, being a woman, I didn’t have rights, after Black people, until women got the right to vote. But because I feel like I’m a woman and I’m marginalized in some way, I don’t protest my country. I don’t see what he’s protesting. I would like to know exactly what he is protesting… 

Noah: …so…

Lahren: …it’s a very…

Noah: So, no, no, how do you protest, then?

Lahren: I don’t protest. Because I’m not a victim. I don’t, I choose not to victimize myself. I choose not to make myself the victim. That’s the difference.

As Lahren continued to question the rationales behind Kaepernick’s protests, Noah continually tried to draw her back to the how, to get her to articulate an alternative method of protest that she would find acceptable. When Lahren discussed her own position as a woman, Noah reframed the question slightly, inquiring “So, how do you protest?” Lahren responded by articulating a different view from her previous one: “I don’t protest. Because I’m not a victim. I don’t, I choose not to victimize myself. I choose not to make myself the victim. That’s the difference.” Here, the entire basis for the argument quickly shifted. Before, the argument was skewing in the direction of a debate over effective and ethical methods for protest. Yet, Noah’s constant refrain finally cut through the anti-intellectual bullshit and arrived at the true core of the argument—whether African Americans have a valid reason to be protesting in the first place. 

Lahren was relying on conflating appropriate methods with appropriate reasons. As a result, her anti-intellectual bullshit worked quite well in inoculating her against counterarguments. So long as she insisted that the methods of protest were inappropriate, and gave reasons as to why, she did not have to touch the notion of what had inspired the protests in the first place. She could merely continue to refute all methods of protest that Noah brought forth without offering an acceptable alternative, a staple of anti-intellectual discourse. Noah was quite aware of this.  

The connection to invitational rhetoric here is not entirely precise but still worth exploring. Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin advocate for invitational rhetoric as an alternative to traditional patriarchal forms of rhetoric that rely primarily on persuasion, and—in turn—control and domination. Foss and Griffin view invitational rhetoric as providing another goal for rhetoric, remarking “Invitational rhetoric constitutes an invitation to the audience to enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor does. In presenting a particular perspective, the invitational rhetor does not judge or denigrate others’ perspectives, even if they differ dramatically from the rhetor’s own” (5). Thus, for Foss and Griffin, creating an atmosphere for invitational rhetoric is predicated on the conditions of safety, value, and freedom. This interview was definitely not a “safe space” by any definition of the term. However, Noah genuinely focused on understanding Lahren’s perspective and—although comedic at times—treated her with respect. The two were quite amicable after the show as well. 

By the end of the interview, Lahren could no longer take shelter in debating the methods of protest—her views were articulated and understood as a critique of the rationales for the protest. While this did not have any clear effect on Lahren’s rhetoric, per se (she still employs anti-intellectual bullshit quite regularly in my opinion), it did make the underpinnings of her rhetorical style much more transparent for viewers of The Daily Show and those who saw this interview through other venues. (It enjoyed a rather broad circulation at the time.)  

Intriguingly, Noah faced criticism for providing Lahren with a platform and for being so amicable with her before and after the show. Yet, his interview probably did more to effectively rebuke Lahren’s arguments than if he had merely played a clip of her show and spoke in a comedic fashion about why she was wrong. By inviting Lahren on his show, Noah and Lahren were able to illuminate and get at the core of their disagreements, providing a more concrete basis for further discussion, discussion in which the parameters are clearly articulated in order to avoid simply talking past one another. He might not have persuaded the most strident of Lahren’s supporters, but those who might be somewhat interested in Lahren’s ideas were presented with some flaws in her argument as well as witnessed the actual basis for her argument. 

While this interview most likely did not change hearts and minds across America, even if it impacted only a small portion of Lahren supporters (or, more likely, those only slightly knowledgeable about Lahren but somewhat sympathetic to her arguments), it can truly benefit political discourse. Unfortunately, overcoming anti-intellectual bullshit cannot happen in a tidal wave of logical argumentation and reasoning since anti-intellectual bullshit is powerful. It renders itself unassailable in clever ways and oftentimes preys upon the audience’s proclivities and biases. Instead, this is a burdensome task that requires a long process that relies on slowly exposing how anti-intellectual bullshit operates through insisting on more clearly articulated lines of reasoning. As such, we are going to have to “poke a few holes in the dam” before the water can break through.

Throughout this interview, Noah embraced the understanding aspect of invitational rhetoric, but he did so in an intriguingly upfront manner that allowed for a civil form of confrontation. He displayed a willingness to listen and understand, yet he was strident in demanding that the perspective of his interlocutor be fully explained. Noah’s approach put on display the inconsistencies of Lahren’s argument in a fashion that—while confrontational—was not aggressive. This makes it a model for how to engage people employing anti-intellectual bullshit for two primary reasons. First, his approach demonstrates that the key to dealing with anti-intellectual bullshit is not necessarily to argue against it; instead, the most effective rhetorical strategy appears to be insisting your interlocutor clearly define the parameters of the argument. He embraced invitational rhetoric but added a degree of confrontation to it which allowed for—but also insisted upon—understanding. Second, since his approach remained civil, he was able to avoid evoking strong emotions from his opponent along with those who might support her. After all, it is difficult to be offended when your interlocutor politely insists that you articulate your argument more completely and then sits back, gives you time to talk, and listens genuinely and attentively to what you have to say. Invitational rhetoric provides a pathway to confront the poor reasoning that is hallmark of anti-intellectual bullshit without being aggressive and confrontational, allowing for hostile audiences to potentially be more open to reconsidering their views rather than immediately becoming defensive.

On Vulnerability in Rhetoric and Remaining Vigilant of Ourselves  

Can we really call bullshit? I contend that the answer is a rather qualified yes. As I hope to have shown with my argument, the concept of bullshit is inherently complicated regardless of whether you approach it from the intention of the speaker, the reception of the audience, and/or the nature of the discourse itself. Arguments regarding the intent of the speaker rely on inference and speculation to a degree that can be seen as problematic at best. Audience reception seems intriguing at first glance, but it fails to account for when bullshit is actually successful; accomplishing its aims oftentimes relies on the audience not feeling as if they have been bullshitted and not being able to detect the bullshit. And calling bullshit through the inherent features of the discourse itself is often fraught with epistemological perils that force us to confront whether we are discussing “truth” in an absolute sense (which is nearly impossible) or merely adjudicating our own peculiar notions of truth as if we have a privileged vantage point to which others must adhere.

The category of anti-intellectual bullshit offers the capacity to call bullshit not in an absolute, definitive sense but rather in a contextual sense. It affords the ability to critique discourse as bullshit when it fails to adhere to its own epistemological boundaries that it has set, whether explicitly or implicitly. Essentially, it employs a rhetor’s own standards as the basis of critique. And, most importantly, it leaves a tremendous amount of room for negotiation, for discussion of what exactly the parameters of the discourse are, of what truths should be counted as valid, and of what notions of truth we should adhere to in a specific context. In this manner, anti-intellectual bullshit avoids framing itself in relation to absolute truth and focuses rather on contextual truth.

And yet, even as I offer a method for calling bullshit, I also believe it is important that we remain cautious of such accusations. In Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, Richard Hofstadter never explicitly defines anti-intellectualism, but he does offer this observation: “The common strain that binds together the attitudes and ideas which I call anti-intellectual is a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it…” (7). Although I find this definition enlightening, I also find it problematic since it insinuates that only certain people (namely non-intellectuals) can engage in anti-intellectualism, creating an us vs. them mentality. However, everyone can be guilty of anti-intellectual bullshit. In fact, as intellectuals and academics, I would argue, we are actually quite adept at it, capable of weaving well-crafted arguments that can easily deflect certain types of evidence and/or lines of reasoning regardless of their validity. It is imperative, then, that we not only train our bullshit detectors on others but also remain tirelessly vigilant of ourselves. 

The desire to maintain knowledge and truth that is a driving force behind anti-intellectual bullshit is something anyone can succumb to. Although it is easy to judge Lahren for her line of reasoning in her interview with Noah, there is a certain appeal to the manner in which she argues. So long as she maintains the focus on methods of protest, her deeper, more personal beliefs and convictions about the Black Lives Matter movement and the plight of African Americans in regard to the criminal justice system (which she is skeptical of) can go unchallenged. These beliefs are not as easy to defend and may cause her reputational damage. Many of us do not agree with Lahren, but we may indeed have our own belief that is predicated off of an assumption or value that we hold dearly and wish to not be challenged. If we can just avoid exposing it, we can continue to maintain the knowledge and truth that is important to us.

Rhetorician Jenny Rice draws upon a metaphor of disgust when articulating what she finds so troubling about bullshit. Her words capture the dangers of the maintenance of truth at all costs quite well:

Yet this is precisely the delicate beauty of rhetoric. In a moment of exposure before my interlocutor, my beliefs are likewise exposed to the possibility of transformation. I may feel the frightening possibility that my core belief is questionable, or that my longstanding commitment to a cause may not be completely defensible. Yet, bullshit blocks this mutuality, this exchange of porousness. (470)

Anti-intellectual bullshit, at its core, starts with answers and filters evidence in order to allow for the maintenance of one’s views and beliefs; however, it sacrifices inquiry, a ceaseless search for truth, and the willingness to change one’s mind when confronted with evidence that contradicts one’s views and beliefs. Anti-intellectual bullshit props up the worst of competitive instincts. It creates a form of rhetoric in which the desire to win is so strong that truth is not capable of being advanced.

It might be too easy to attribute this to competitiveness, though. Lurking within Rice’s discussions of rhetorical exchange is an element of fear, a feeling of vulnerability. By creating its own set of rules from which it is impenetrable, anti-intellectual bullshit protects a rhetor from having to be vulnerable in a discussion or debate. So long as that cherished assumption or value is protected, the rhetor will not have to reflect, will not have to cede a point, will never have to question previous assumptions or look back on past opinions and behaviors with regret. 

Yet, for a true rhetorical exchange, vulnerability relies on vulnerability. As with any relation, it is nearly impossible to be vulnerable without an assurance of vulnerability in return. As a result, if we engage in anti-intellectual bullshit and defend ourselves from being vulnerable, rarely if ever will our interlocutor offer us this reciprocal vulnerability. Perhaps the trick to moving past such a stance, then, is to no longer view truth as a finite destination but rather as something that can never truly be obtained but is—nevertheless—worth striving for. When we engage with others, we need to be amendable; we need to be willing to be vulnerable and have our views challenged. In the end, it might be more enlightening to focus on continually formulating and refining opinions rather than becoming obsessed with defending them. 

Even more importantly, if we only meet anti-intellectual bullshit with anti-intellectual bullshit of our own, nothing meaningful can be accomplished. It is easy to critique anti-intellectual bullshit; it is remarkably difficult to not be seduced by it. The ability to formulate discourse which cannot be challenged or questioned is enticing. The safety and security of maintaining truth is comforting. But it is vital to remain perpetually watchful that, when faced with anti-intellectual bullshit, we do not fall prey to the desire to combat it in kind. After all, when you fight bullshit with bullshit, everyone usually just ends up covered in…